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INTRODUCTION

In the book of Genesis, God is forthright in sentencing:
Then to Adam He said, "Because you have listened to the
voice of your wife, and have eaten from the tree about which
I commanded you, saying, 'you shall not eat from it'; Cursed
is the ground because of you; In toil you shall eat of it all the
days of your life. Both thorns and thistles it shall grow for
you; and you will eat the plants of the field; By the sweat of
your face you will eat bread, till you return to the ground,
because from it you were taken; For you are dust, and to dust
you shall return."'
And so Adam and Eve were cast out of Eden. The sentence described in
Genesis is all about outcome. It primarily speaks to retribution, but could be

1. Genesis 3:17-19 (New American Standard). Eve received an equally harsh sentence, that
of painful childbirth. Genesis 3:16.
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read as also addressing the remaining three traditional goals of sentencing:
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.2
Through the centuries, and certainly through the course of most of
American history, sentencing has focused on individual outcomes and these
traditional goals.' However, the historic focus on individual outcomes, carved
by judges looking to the future of the individual and society, has been lost
within the federal criminal law. The traditional goals have been eclipsed by two
inter-connected and powerful forces: first, the broad purpose of making
sentences uniform as embodied in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,4 and
second, the trend toward packing other social goals into the process of
sentencing, diluting the role of the traditional, individual outcome goals. Most
prominent among these process changes has been the shift of fact-finding from
trial to sentencing and the increasing role given to victims.
These changes have largely been driven by the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, which were imposed in 1987.' While federal law and the
Guidelines themselves continue to profess that they serve the individual
outcome goals of incapacitation, retribution, rehabilitation, and deterrence, 6
these same Guidelines have specifically undermined sentencingjudges' ability
to achieve these goals. In short, the Guidelines' emphasis on superficial
uniformity and social goals embedded in the process of sentencing has had an
unsettling effect: The judge'sjob of crafting a sentence for the defendant before
her has largely been replaced by the task of conducting a sentencing as rigidly
directed by the book before her.'
The result of the eclipse of the traditional goals in favor of process8 and
uniformity is that federal sentencing now diverges not only from our long
history of judicial discretion in sentencing, but from the core interests of the
United States Constitution and American law in at least three ways: First, these

2. Patricia M. Wald, Why Focus on Women Offenders?, 16 CRIM. JUST. 10, 11 (Spring
2001) (listing traditional goals of sentencing).
3. See generally KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING
GUIDELINES INTHE FEDERAL COURTS 9-22 (1998) (describing the role of goals of punishment and
rehabilitation in American history).
4. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA3 (2001).
5. Id. § 1A2.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA (2001).
7. See STITH & CABRANES, supranote 3, at 84 ("The sentencing proceeding itself has been
recast from a discretionary into a formal adjudicatory process, in which the court makes findings
of fact that translate into sentencing requirements under the Guidelines."). While many have
decried the loss of discretion by sentencing judges, most powerfully Stith and Cabranes, this
change has not yet been thoroughly analyzed with a sustained focus on outcome and process
goals.
8. In this Article, "process" refers to the mechanism set out by the Guidelines to determine
a sentence. This is much different than, and often in tension with, Due Process as required in the
United States Constitution, and the two should not be confused. While Due Process protects
individual rights, the process required by the Guidelines seeks to impose uniformity between
sentences, a project that necessarily sets aside the individual consideration essential to Due
Process.
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core interests direct justice to look more often to individual outcomes, rather
than to group equities or efficiency through process as an end in itself.9 Most

recently, the importance of individualized consideration has been strongly
expressed within the field of sentencing in death penalty cases, while the
Guidelines head in the opposite direction. Second, fact-finding was historically
a function of trial, and its shift to sentencing has resulted in an unsettling loss
of rights. Third, the admirable goal of giving the victim a role in prosecution
has undercut the traditional maxim that the prosecutor has no client but justice.
Sentencing judges' subversion of the Guidelines"0 may be a result of the

conflict between these core interests and the Guidelines-the judges are being
loyal to legal values inculcated through a life in the law, rather than to the
Guidelines and the different set of value-laden goals they further.
The purpose of this Article is not simply to document the loss of
sentencing's traditional goals under the Guidelines' rigid format for arriving at
a sentence (that task has been done quite well by others)," but to add to the
existing discussion. Specifically, I hope to describe how the Guidelines, under
the rubric of uniformity, have not just ignored, but have actively prevented
consideration of the traditional goals. Further, this Article will show how,
together with (and as a part of) the machinery of uniformity, the emergence of
fact-finding as a goal of sentencing has run over and killed the traditional
goals.'" This is so because under the Guidelines these factors are assured an
active and often determinative role in the sentencing process, an active role
now denied the traditional goals. 3 Finally, this Article offers specific reforms

of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines which would allow the traditional goals

9. See infra Part III.A.
10. Ten years ago, Prof. Daniel Freed observed that, because of such subversion, an
"underground level of sentencing seems to be displacing the first, visible level." Daniel J. Freed,
Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of
Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1683 (1992); see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 5
("Ironically, however, disparity-different sentences for defendants whose crimes and criminal
histories seem similar-may be as great under the Guidelines as it was under the discretionary
system it replaced.").
11. See generally Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and PurposefulDepartures: Fixing a
Jurisprudencethat Undermines the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 21
(2000); Marc Miller, Purposesat Sentencing,66 S. CAL. L. REv. 413 (1992); Daniel J. Freed &
Marc Miller, Taking"Purposes"Seriously: The NeglectedRequirementofGuideline Sentencing,
3 FED. SENT. REP. 295 (1991) (introducing an issue devoted to the purposes of sentencing).
12. Of course, the shift of fact-finding to sentencing is largely driven by the Guidelines'
quest for uniformity. Uniformity requires the creation of categories ofsimilar defendants, which
in turn requires that sentencing bring out the facts needed to sort the defendants.
13. This Article addresses the growth of fact-finding and victim participation in sentencing
as process goals, but there are others. For example, as thoroughly addressed by Doug Berman,
the Guidelines' requirement that certain factors be outside the "heartland" of cases for a
departure to be appropriate creates a process to be fulfilled by the judge, with no relation to the
goals the Guidelines are supposed to promote. Berman, supra note 11, at 66-69; see also Michael
Goldsmith & Marcus Porter, Lake Wobegon and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: The Problem
ofDisparateDepartures,69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 57, 88-89 (2000).
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a more vigorous role in the life of federal criminal law, within the context of
the Guideline system which is already in place.
Part II of this Article will describe the ways in which the traditional goals
have been lost and may be further lost in the future. First, it will address the
ways in which uniformity was enforced with the imposition of the Guidelines
in 1987 by describing the rigid structural process put in place, the limitations
placed on consideration of personal characteristics, and the elimination of
parole. Second, it will examine in detail the already-expanded role of factfinding in sentencing. Finally, it will look to what may be a future threat to the
traditional goals, embodied in the still-evolving call for victim participation in
sentencing.
Part III will examine the impact of these changes on the Sentencing
Commission, the sentencing judge, and the prosecutor, as each works within
a system which increasingly is focused on process goals and adrift from the
traditional outcome goals of retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and
incapacitation.
Part IV assesses the costs of these changes on the system as a whole and
the disparity between goals expressed elsewhere in the law and those now
promoted in federal sentencing. Finally, three changes are suggested: that the
traditional goals be favored under the Guidelines as the express basis for
limited departures from the ordinary Guideline range, that the current relevant
conduct rule be displaced in favor of a possible upward departure based on the
need for incapacitation, and that defendants be allowed to move for a
downward departure where they have cooperated with the government, on the
basis of a decreased need for retribution. By inserting the traditional goals into
those areas where the Guidelines are most actively used, we can come closer
to an honest, fair system which recognizes the ability of the judge to do more
than follow and manipulate a complex and methodical process divorced from
their own best instincts.
II. How WE GOT LOST
The year 1987 was revolutionary in federal sentencing. The first
Sentencing Manual was issued, which simultaneously proclaimed and
destroyed the traditional sentencing goals of retribution, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and incapacitation. These goals were simply not included in the
structure of the Guidelines and were replaced by a methodical process of
arithmetic calculations and rules which furthered, more than anything, the goal
of efficiency by encouraging pleas and shifting fact-finding from trial to the
sentencing hearing.
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Uniformity and the Sentencing Guidelines
1. Pledging (False)Allegiance to the TraditionalOutcome Goals

The Federal Statute governing "imposition of a sentence," 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), directs that
[t]he court, in determining the particular sentence to be
imposed, shall consider...
(2) the need for the sentence imposed(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for
the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in'the most effective manner .... 1
In order, these goals 5 are usually described as retribution, deterrence, 6
incapacitation, and rehabilitation. 7 However, each can fairly be described as
an individual outcome goal of sentencing-that is, one which will be fulfilled
as to the defendant only by the sentence which is imposed. For example,
incapacitation is achieved by the person actually serving a sentence often years
in prison, that being the outcome of the sentencing process.

14. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).
15. The goals ofsentencing as traditionally expressed prior to the advent of the Sentencing
Guidelines sometimes also included "denunciation," which has been defined as using the
sentence "as a symbol of distinctively criminal 'guilt,' as an affirmation and re-enforcement of
moral standards, and as reassurance to the law abiding." MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL
SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 106 (1973). Elements of denunciation appear to be
intermingled with the goal ofretribution in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). Denunciation would seem
to be a process goal, in that it is achieved simply by the process of issuing a sentence, rather than
by service of the sentence.
16. At times, the goal set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) will be described as specific
deterrence rather than incapacitation. E.g., United States v. Burgos, 276 F.3d 1284, 1288 (11 th
Cir. 2001) ("First, in enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000), Congress codified four sentencing
objectives courts must take into account in fashioning a sentence: punishment, general
deterrence, specific deterrence, and rehabilitation."). This construction seems inaccurate, as true
specific deterrence would extend beyond the period of incapacitation to any subsequent period
in which the defendant is otherwise free to commit crimes but for the fear of the punishment she
has already experienced. In other words, specific deterrence is distinct from incapacitation in that
it is not limited to that period in which the defendant is incapacitated.
17. Some commentators have claimed that Congress removed the goal ofrehabilitation in
passing the Sentencing Reform Act. MILLER, supranote 11, at 434. However, the plain language
of the statute contains this "corrective" goal. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (2000).
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In turn, the Guidelines refer to these four basic goals of sentencing on the
very first page, below the section heading The Statutory Mission: "The
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Title II of the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984) provides for the development of guidelines that will further the
basic purposes of criminal punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, just
punishment, and rehabilitation."' 8
These same goals are again referred to in the introduction to the
Guidelines' section on criminal history: "The Comprehensive Crime Control
Act sets forth four purposes of sentencing. (See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).)"' 9
However, this pledge of allegiance to the mandate of history was lost in a
very large mix. The Sentencing Commission took on a long list of stated
mandates, most of which had nothing to do with the traditional outcome goals.
Consider a list of just the most obviously stated of those policy directives:
*
*

*
"
"
"

*
*

To reduce disparities through greater "uniformity. 20
To limit the effects of age, education, vocational skills, mental
condition, physical condition, employment record, family relationships
and community ties on sentencing.2
To achieve "truth in sentencing" by eliminating parole.22
To somehow merge real offense and charge offense sentencing
21
practices.
To enhance efficiency by encouraging plea agreements.24
To achieve "proportionality" between different criminal acts.25
To reflect "advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates
to the criminal justice process. ' '26
27
To take into account current prison capacity.

The first three of these mandates reflect different facets of the same
objective-the reduction of disparities and achievement of greater uniformity.
While sharing this common genesis, each has played a major role in developing
a system which actively prevents judges from pursuing the traditional

18. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1 (A) (2001).

19. Id. § 4A 1.1 introductory cmt.
20. Id. § IA3; 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(i)(B).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2000).
22. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A3 (2001).

23. Id. § IA4(a). Real offense sentencing considers the actions ofthe defendant, regardless
of what he is charged by the government. Charge offense sentencing limits its consideration to
what is described in the indictment or information. The Sentencing Guidelines contain elements
of both. Id.
24. Id. § 1A4(c).
25. Id. § lA3.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C) (2000).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 994(g) (2000) (directing Commission to take into account the capacity of
the prison system). As § 994(g) is an example, some of these policy directives were explicitly

set forth in the statute, which gave primary direction to the Sentencing Commission. Id.
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sentencing goals, as discussed below. Notably, at least a few of these mandates
(which are not related to uniformity) have been actively ignored by the
Sentencing Commission, especially at the development stage of the Guidelines.
For example, the directive that the Guidelines reflect advancements in
psychology was flatly ignored.28 Similarly, prison capacity has had to follow
the effects of the Guidelines (and mandatory minimums) rather than vice versa,
resulting in the building of additional capacity as sentences have grown
longer.29
2.

The Mandate of Uniformity and the Death ofDiscretion

As opposed to creating a system to allow judges to evaluate these
traditional goals, the language of section 1A of the Guidelines makes it clear
that it is the Guidelines themselves that should encompass these goals 3 -that
the Guidelineswill direct sentencing judges to specific outcomes which punish,
deter, incapacitate, and rehabilitate, rather than the judge doing so based on her
own perceptions.31 In other words, it is the formulaic operation of the Guideline
calculation which will achieve the traditional outcome goals. However, the
Sentencing Guidelines which emerged fail at this task.32
And how could the Guidelines not fail? The bare fact damning this task to
failure was that the Guidelines were expressly developed to eliminate the very
discretion which allowed these individual goals to be achieved in distinct
cases--discretion which was seen as fostering disparities in sentencing.33 But,
of course, the ability of the sentencing judge in the pre-Guidelines regime to
take into account the individual characteristics of the defendant was precisely

28. One compelling critique of this process is that it failed to consider factors other than
"prior federal sentencing decisions and theory that came primarily from economics," to the
exclusion of psychological theory. R. Barry Ruback & Jonathan Wroblewski, The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Psychological and Policy Reasons for Simplification, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB.

POL'Y & L. 739, 742 (2001).
29. Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of
Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REv. 61, 72 & n.53 (1993).

30. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § ]A (2001). At section IBI, the
Guidelines instruct judges on how to determine a sentence, but at no point do the Guidelines
instruct a consideration of the traditional sentencing goals, other than as they might implicitly
be incorporated into the Guidelines themselves. Id. § 1B 1.1.
31. The statute creating the Sentencing Commission also claims that a "purpose" of the
Commission in creating the Guidelines is to "assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing
as set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code." 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(a)
(2000).
32. In his seminal article on the purposes of sentencing under the Guidelines, Marc Miller
noted that the Guidelines project was unique in trying to take the traditional goals out of the
hands of thejudges and push them into rules controlling thejudges, and he suggested that "[t]his
absence of prior models for-integrating sentencing purposes into actual systems suggests the
difficulty of the exercise. It raises questions about whether such an integration is possible and
whether such a difficult effort is likely to be worthwhile." MILLER, supra note 11, at 479-80.
33. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 104.
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what created the "disparities" which led to the imposition of the Guidelines. It
is no surprise that the reaction to these disparities (the Guidelines) swept away
the ability to achieve the goals which motivated judges to give those disparate
sentences in the first place. Perhaps what should be surprising is that the
Guidelines even purport to further those goals they had made obsolete.
Giving way to this quandary, the Sentencing Commission purposefully
punted away these traditional goals in drafting the initial Guidelines. Rather,
they expressly decided not to base the sentencing grid on any one or all of the
traditional factors and decided instead to codify what the "typical, or average,
actual past practice" was in the federal system for each crime.34 Other options
were present-for example, the Commission could have decided which crimes
deserved longer sentences because rehabilitation was less likely or retribution
more deserved. By simply replicating past patterns, the Commission passed on
this most basic opportunity to make the traditional goals mean something in the
modem era. Thus, no underlying principle other than uniformity was the
functional basis for the Guidelines as written.
3. The Creation of the Uniformity Machine
Demanding that sentences be made more uniform from one case to the
next 5 did the most damage to the pursuit of the traditional purposes of
sentencing. Of course, uniformity of sentences works directly in opposition to
the traditional individual outcome goals. In forcing sentences to be more
uniform, the Guidelines strike directly at the ability of the sentencing judge to
consider the traditional goals. Those goals, especially rehabilitation, require an
examination of individual factors in each case-a project in direct tension with
the goal of uniformity.
Under the Guidelines that were established, uniformity was achieved
primarily by creating a mechanistic mathematical formula using certain facts
about the case.36 This directs the sentencing judge to determine whether certain
factors are present, calculate the defendant's criminal history, and pick a
sentence from a narrow range described in a 258-box grid with two axes-one
reflecting the facts of the offense (the offense score), the other based on the
criminal history of the defendant.37 The only escape from these narrow ranges
is via a "departure," which is allowable only when the defendant cooperates
with the government or some factor in the case was "not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the

34. Stephen Breyer, The FederalSentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon

Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 17 (1988). Justice Breyer was a member of the
Commission which originally drafted the Guidelines.
35. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A3 (2001).
36. See id. § IBI.1.

37. See id. § 5A.
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guidelines ... ,,3' The Guidelines, in mandating the formulaic calculation of
a sentence on the grid, excluded the traditional goals of sentencing from those
arcane calculations. While the thick-as-your-wrist Guideline Manual
specifically directs sentencing judges to make thousands of determinations on
discrete points, not once does it direct that a specific decision leading to the
applicable guideline range on the 258-box grid should or must turn on the
consideration of one or all of the traditional goals of sentencing.
4. The Limitations on ConsideringPersonalCharacteristics
Not only do the Guidelines ignore the traditional goals of sentencing, in
some ways they actively prevent the traditional goals from being considered.
Tied to the goal of more uniform sentences is the mandate that the Guidelines
limit consideration of personal characteristics such as age, education,
vocational skills, mental condition, physical condition, employment record, and
family and community ties, and the directive that wealth be barred from
consideration.39 However, these same factors constitute much of what informs
a judge's decision to, for example, seek rehabilitation in a given case. After all,
if a defendant has vocational skills and strong family ties, it will be more likely
that she can be rehabilitated if tethered to work and family.
Consistent with the statutory mandate, under the Guidelines, the factors of
age,4' education, 1 vocational skills,42 mental condition,43 physical condition,"
employment record,45 and family and community ties 4' are deemed "not
ordinarily relevant ' 47 in determining whether a sentence may be outside the

very restrictive range48 described in the Guidelines. Even after the Supreme
Court's decision in Koon v. United States,49 these personal characteristics are
only considered "if such characteristic or circumstance is present to an unusual
degree and distinguishes the case from the 'heartland' cases covered by the
guidelines.""0 Were the traditional outcome goals to be honored,"' these factors

38. Id. § 5K2.0 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (b) (2000)).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2000).
40. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H .1 (2001).
41. Id. § 5H1.2.
42. Id.
43. Id. § 5H1.3.
44. Id. § 5H1.4.
45. Id. § 5H1.5.
46. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (2001).
47. Id.
48. By law, the top end of such a range can only be 25% higher than the bottom end. 28
U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (2000).
49. 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996).
50. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (2001).

51. Intriguingly, in the wake ofthe Guidelines and Koon, the goals of sentencing have been

described as simply "uniformity" and "fairness." Deborah E. Dezelan, Case Comment,
Departuresfrom the Federal Sentencing Guidelines after Koon v. United States: More
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would be useful in cases not cast as "unusual. ' 12 For example, were
incapacitation truly to remain a factor, an examination of education and
vocational skills should be a consideration. A man or woman with no
employment prospects or an unstable emotional condition is more likely to
return to crime, and thus could be a stronger candidate for incapacitation.
Similarly, someone with skills and education (or the willingness to get them
while in prison) is more likely to be rehabilitated in prison and is a candidate
for an earlier, successful release.
The Guidelines are even stricter in limiting consideration of wealth: The
factor of socioeconomic status is barred from consideration "in the
determination of a sentence." 3 This immovable barrier prevents the court from
pursuing the goal of retribution by more harshly punishing those who have
benefited most from the society they violated or, conversely, less harshly
punishing those who have benefited little from society. 4 While the goal of
limiting discretion as to certain facts about the defendant may achieve a
reduction in bias by judges, it also effectively guts their ability to honestly
evaluate the potential for retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and
incapacitation in individual defendants.
5.

The Elimination ofParole

The final nail in the coffin for the traditional outcome goals was the
Guidelines' elimination of parole in the federal system." This single act badly
damaged the vitality of the traditional outcome goals-as it eliminated the
player best positioned to evaluate and effectuate those goals, the Parole
Commission.
Prior to the advent of the Guidelines era, the percentage of the sentence
that would actually be served was controlled by the Parole Commission, an
executive branch agency. The sentencing judge would issue a sentence, 6 but
the Parole Commission would determine the release date and the conditions of

Discretion,Less Discretion, 72 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1679, 1683 (1997).
52. Under the present rule, counsel and commentators are spending their time trying to
define and redefine "ordinary" and "extraordinary." For example, some have argued that a
female inmate who has children is not "ordinary," and thus a departure may be appropriate,
despite the large proportion of female inmates who have children. See Myrna S. Raeder,
Remember the Family: Seven Myths About Single ParentingDepartures, 13 FED. SENT. REP.
251, 251-52 (2001).
53. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.10 (2001).
54. Of course, this restriction also prevents ajudge from giving a defendant a break simply
because the defendant is wealthy. It is doubtful that a judge would expressly base a departure
downward on the fact that a defendant is well-off, though this practice could be pursued by
misdirection with or without the Guidelines.
55. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (repealed 1987).
56. Knowing that the parole board could modify the sentence, some judges tried to
anticipate parole when crafting sentences, a factor which probably created disparities. Freed,
supra note 10, at 1688.
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release.57 The parole board was able to adjust a sentence to fit the traditional
goals based not only on the crime committed and the defendant's criminal
history, but on behavior during incarceration. 8 Obviously, the parole board was
well situated to review these outcome goals since part of the intended outcome
had already occurred. For example, rehabilitation could be evaluated based on
accomplishments toward that goal. With the Guidelines, this tool for achieving
outcome goals was gone.5 9 Were the Guidelines again to accommodate
consideration of the traditional individual outcome factors, the evaluation of
those factors would be solely in the hands of the sentencing judges and the
appellate court which reviews them. Regardless of whether the Guidelines are
amended as suggested below, the elimination of parole is unlikely to be
reversed,6" and any future individual consideration of retribution, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and incapacitation in sentencing is likely to be based only on
foresight, rather than hindsight.
B. Good-bye Trial, Hello Sentence Hearing:Fact-FindingBecomes a
Process Goal ofSentencing

Much has been made of the increasing importance under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines of section 5K1. ,6 which allows for a departure from
the Guidelines "[u]pon motion of the government stating that the defendant has
provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another
person ... "62 However, section 5K1.1 is only part of a larger trend under the
Guidelines. As described below, incentives are provided throughout the
Guidelines for the parties to bring out facts at sentencing.63

57. Frank 0. Bowman, III, FearofLaw: Thoughts on Fear of Judging and the State ofthe
FederalSentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 299, 302 (2000).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 4206 (repealed 1987).
59. The Guidelines did not alter the existence of "good time" credit in the prison, though
such credit was limited to 15% of time served. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (2000). See also Gerald W.
Heaney, The Reality of GuidelinesSentencing: No End to Disparity,28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161,
176-77 & n.51 (1991) (comparing guideline to pre-guideline sentences).
60. United States v. Bogle, 693 F. Supp. 1102, 1111 (S.D. Fla. 1988) ("To abolish the
Guideline system and yet find that the elimination of parole was severable would be to
exacerbate the very problem of disparity in sentencing that Congress sought to remedy by the
Act.").
61. See, e.g., The American College of Trial Lawyers Report and Proposalon Section
5K].I ofthe United States Sentencing Guidelines, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1503(2001) [hereinafter
TrialLawyers Proposal](proposing changes to section 5K 1.1that could provide greater fairness
in the system).
62. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5KI. 1(2001).
63. Of course, the ability to bring out facts at sentencing is not new. For example, even the
ability to increase a sentence based on conduct for which a defendant has been acquitted (in
some cases, on the basis of evidence brought out at sentencing but not at trial) predates the
Guidelines. See Barry L. Johnson, If At First You Don't Succeed-Abolishing the Use of
Acquitted Conduct in Guidelines Sentencing, 75 N.C. L. REV. 153, 195-96 (1996). What is new
is the provision of expressly stated incentives to the defendant to bring forth facts. This incentive
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This goal of bringing out the truth has now been established through
practice as a practical goal of sentencing which is entirely fulfilled (or fails)
prior to the issuance of the sentence itself and is embedded not in that sentence,
but in the process leading up to the sentencing. In many cases, the process of
fact-finding-through departures under section 5KI.1, adjustments for
acceptance of responsibility, application of the "safety valve" provision in drug
cases, and the use of relevant conduct against the defendant-has more of an
effect on the sentence than any other factor. In particular, the emergence of this
process goal has further obscured the traditional individual outcome goals the
Guidelines supposedly promote, perhaps delivering the death blow to those
fundamental ideals of criminal law that the traditional goals embody.
The emerging importance of fact-finding at sentencing is in part a function
of the fact that so many cases are now resolved by plea rather than trial,
deferring to the sentencing phase questions that would, in the past, have been
determined by evidence at trial. For example, in the year 2000, 95.5% of
convicted federal defendants pled guilty and avoided trial.' Anyone doubting
the significance of the movement of evidence presentation to sentencing and
the complexity of the issues related to the movement in both state and federal
systems should be convinced by the tumult65 surrounding the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. United States." There, the Supreme
Court held that New Jersey's law shifting the ability to enhance a sentence
above statutory maximums to the sentencing judge was unconstitutional.67 The
problem identified by the Supreme Court in the New Jersey system is a
symptom of the same problem explored here: the departure from tradition in
shifting fact-finding to sentencing, which unfortunately also marks a departure
from the goals and protections offered by the old system.
1. Section 5K. I as the 900-Pound Gorillaof Sentencing
Section 5K 1.1 is fairly unusual within the Sentencing Guidelines because
it offers the Court (and, through negotiation in some cases, the parties) the

is made more appealing to defendants as the Guidelines have eliminated other possible ways of
reducing sentences, including appeals to the traditional sentencing goals, such as an argument
that rehabilitation is possible because of vocational skills. See id.
64. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Federal Sentencing Statistics by State, District & Circuit
Category,
Primary Offense
Mode
of Conviction by
(2000),
http://www.ussc.gov/JUDPACK/JP2000.htm.
65. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibos, How Apprendi Affects InstitutionalAllocations ofPower,
87 IOWA L. REv. 465 (2002) (exploring the impact of Apprendi on the allocation of power in the
criminal justice system).
66. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
67. Id. at 497.
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nearly unique" ability to obtain a downward departure69 below not only the
guideline range, but below a statutory mandatory minimum sentence.70
The significance of the downward departure for cooperation would be hard
to underestimate. As even federal prosecutors will admit, it is rare for a multidefendant federal case to be free of government witnesses who are not enjoying
either a break on their own sentence or a grant of immunity.7 Nationwide,72

such departures are granted in about nineteen percent of all cases with a
criminal conviction and constitute no less than seventy percent of all
departures.73 However, this is just a fraction of the cases impacted by section
5K1.1. Making these numbers even more significant is the fact that less than
half of those defendants who provide assistance to the government receive a
departure for their efforts.74

These numbers reflect what prosecutors and defense attorneys know by
experience: that section 5Kl.1 departures are very often the most important
part of the case in determining the ultimate sentence,75 certainly more important
than the traditional goals.76

Of course, there is a reason behind this most important incentive in the
entire Guidelines system: Such cooperation can make criminal prosecutions
more efficient, in part, by inducing more defendants to plead guilty (once a co-

68. The only other provision allowing a departure below statutory mandatory minimums
is Guideline section 5C1.2 (in conjunction with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(0 (2000)) often referred to as
the "safety valve" provision in narcotics cases. As discussed below, this section also requires the
defendant to provide facts honestly. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.2(a)(5)
(2001).
69. Though section 5K1.1 speaks generally only of "departures," it is unlikely that any
judge would give an upward departure where the government has certified the defendant's
substantial assistance. Id. § 5Kl.l.
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (2000).
71. George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts,
28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 1 (2000).
72. Notably, the rates of departure under section 5KI.1 vary widely from district to district,
even within the same geographic region. For example, in 1995, the District of Connecticut
granted departures in less than 10% of all such cases, while in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, a departure was made under section 5KlI in 42% of eligible cases. STITH &
CABRANES, supra note 3, at 117.
73. TrialLawyers Proposal,supra note 61, at 1503-04.
74. Trial Lawyers Proposal,supra note 61, at 1504.
75. The incentive to cooperate is especially strong in narcotics cases. Ellen Yaroshefsky,
Cooperation with FederalProsecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68
FORDHAm L. REV. 917, 928 (1999). This is no doubt true in part because of the strict mandatory
minimum sentences under federal law. For example, distribution of only five grams of crack
cocaine brings a mandatory minimum sentence of five years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii)
(2000).
76. The fading significance of the traditional goals is reflected in the rarity of cases in
which those goals shape the extent of a departure under section 5KI. 1. One such case is United
States v. Casiano, 923 F. Supp. 684, 688 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 113 F.3d 420 (3d Cir. 1997),
where the trial judge expressly cited the goals of"punishment, rehabilitation, deterrence, and the
protection of society" as reasons for not departing further, as the defendant had urged.
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defendant has rolled over on them)." However, this is not an unmitigated good:
Providing a uniquely strong incentive to defendants to provide information on
others can be, unfortunately, as much of an incentive to dishonest information
as it is to honest information. This is especially true when there is a mandatory
minimum and the only way around that floor is to provide information to the
government.78

One commentator, having spoken to federal prosecutors at length about the
use of cooperating defendants hopeful to get a downward departure under
section 5K1.1, concluded that this strong motivation to provide information,
true or untrue, was one reason that the use of unreliable cooperator testimony
was a problem warranting "further study and reform." 79Another commentator

has concluded that "[t]he probative value of any potentially coerced testimony
is suspect; courts have recognized the power of emotional coercion as well as
physical intimidation."8 At one point, a panel of the Tenth Circuit, before
being overturned en banc, even ruled that the government's recommendation
for a break under section 5K1.1 in return for testimony was a violation of the
federal gratuity statute, 8' a decision which, despite its reversal, had "quick and
widespread aftershocks. 82
Given the near-unanimity of these critiques, it is fair to say that the policy
reason behind section 5K1.1 (to encourage defendants to cooperate with the
government in investigations) may be seen as a double-edged sword,
encouraging both honest and dishonest information. 3 This ambivalent
accomplishment is even more frightening in context: The process goal of
bringing forth cooperator information now is far more important than the
traditional outcome goals. For example, while the hope for retribution has been

77. Korin K. Ewing, Note, Establishingan EqualPlayingFieldfor CriminalDefendants
in the Aftermath ofUnited States v. Singleton, 49 DUKE L.J. 1371, 1397 (2000).
78. The problem in many cases is not that the defendants lie to hide their own involvement,
but lie to give the prosecutors what the defendant thinks the prosecutor wants. Yaroshefsky,
supranote 75, at 952-53. This is exacerbated by the Guidelines' requirement that the cooperation
be of"substantial assistance" to the government. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5KI. 1
(2001). Thus, since the information must be helpful to the government, defendants may succumb
to the temptation to create evidence that would meet this level.
79. Yaroshefsky, supra note 75, at 921.
80. Keri A. Gould, Turning Rat andDoing Time for Uncharged,Dismissed, or Acquitted
Crimes: Do the FederalSentencing GuidelinesPromote Respect Forthe Law?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. Hum.RTS. 835, 871 (1993).
81. United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1355 (10th Cir. 1998), rev'd en banc, 165
F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1024 (1999).
82. Ewing, supra note 77, at 1375.
83. Of course, dishonest information should not be rewarded with a departure. However,
the Guidelines oddly do not prevent a downward departure when the defendant has provided
wrong information, noting only that "truthfulness, completeness, and reliability" are factors that
a judge may consider in deciding upon the degree of departure to be given. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5KI. I (a)(2) (2001).
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emasculated as a consideration at sentencing,14 the pursuit of cooperator
testimony has been put in a unique position: It now represents the golden key
which removes the shackles of both the Guidelines and mandatory minimum
sentences.
Sadly, the goal of encouraging cooperation has not only arisen to take the
place of the traditional goals of sentencing in determining what a sentence will
be, but has now come in direct conflict with the primary outcome goal
established by the guidelines themselves-uniformity. Rates of departure under
section 5K1.1 between even neighboring districts vary by as much as over
100%," s thus introducing back into the system the very disparities the
Guidelines were meant to address.8 6 In the end, the traditional goals have been
replaced by new priorities, uniformity and fact-finding, which cannot even get
along with one another.
Furthermore, section 5KI.1 is not the only problematic part of the
Guidelines' regime which promotes fact-finding at the expense of the
traditional goals. As described below, the goal of fact-finding by the defendant
is propagated in the rules regulating the probation interview as well as through
other parts of the Guidelines.
2.

The Problem of Truth at the ProbationInterview

In nearly all federal cases, the probation officer interviews the defendant
as part of her preparations to write a presentence report for the sentencing
judge. The defendant has the right to have counsel present at this interview,
but counsel's presence is not mandatory.88 At that interview, the defendant
must divulge all prior convictions and arrests 9 and may be pressed to discuss
the facts of the case at issue. The penalties for failing to tell the truth or give

84. Primarily, the ability to consider rehabilitation is limited by the sentencing grid itself
and the bar on considering factors such as vocational training at sentencing. See discussion supra
Part II.
85. For example, in 1996, New Hampshire had an average departure rate of 43%, while it's
neighbor, Maine, had a rate of 19% with the same number of prosecutions. Ian Weinstein,

Regulating the Marketfor Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REv. 563, 603 (1999). Similarly, federal judges

in Massachusetts departed under section 5K1.1 in 25.6% of the eligible cases, while in Rhode
Island, next door, such departures were made in only 4.6% of similar cases. Id. at 603-04.
86. These disparities may be explained in part by distinctions between federal circuits,
which encompass several states and often develop divergent precedents on sentencing issues.
One writer, having extensively researched the practices of federal judges in Connecticut (part
of the Second Circuit) and Massachusetts (part ofthe First Circuit), concluded that the disparity
between those districts may have something to do with "the First Circuit's distaste for sentences

outside the Guidelines range." Lisa L. Farabee, DisparateDepartures Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: A Tale of Two Districts, 30 CoNN. L. REV. 569, 631 (1998).
87. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b).
88. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(2).
89. Christopher P. Yates & Louise E. Herrick, Going on Record: The PerilsofDiscussing
Criminal History During the PresentenceInterview, 13 FED. SENT. REP. 330, 330 (2001).
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complete information can be grave and can include an enhancement for
obstruction of justice."
Again, the Guidelines, through the obstruction of justice enhancement,
express an overriding interest in the defendant conveying facts, this time at the
probation interview. Again, the interest appears to be that of efficiency: if the
defendant ponies up the facts, the probation officer does not have to chase them
down elsewhere. This goal of truth-telling, like that directed at cooperating
defendants, has its problems.
As one federal public defender has described it, the requirement that the
defendant reveal full and complete truth may not be as simple as it appears on
its face. In his experience, client recollections of criminal history are "not
nearly as reliable as one might assume given that, on the complicated subject
of criminal history, even the most well-intentioned clients are remarkably poor
historians."9 He notes pragmatically that a defendant may simply not realize
that he was convicted of a crime if, for example, it resulted from a family fight
with a brother and resulted in "no real consequences following his court
date. '92 This defender's story makes the point that the goal of truth-telling by
the defendant may endanger justice even when the defendant is neither a
cooperating witness nor convicted by the testimony of a cooperating witness
receiving a section 5K1.1 departure. Thus, the shift of fact-finding from trial
to sentencing has changed even those parts of the sentencing process which are
generally unseen.
3.

The Odd Requirement of Truth in the Federal "Safety Valve"

Guideline section 5C1.2, commonly referred to as the "safety valve"
provision, in conjunction with section 2D1.1(b)(6), provides two substantial
benefits to some defendants in narcotics trafficking cases: First, his offense
score is lowered by two points.93 Second, and often more importantly, the
requirement of a mandatory minimum sentence is removed.94 In order to
receive these benefits, each of the following must be true:
(1) the defendant does not have more than [one] criminal
history point... ;
(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of
violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon
(or induce another participant to do so) in connection
with the offense;

90. Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (2001)).
91. Daniel W. Stiller, Chapter Four Surprises and a Defender's Longest Drive, 13
SENT. REP. 323, 324 (2001).
92. Id.
93. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Dl.l(b)(6) (2001).
94. Id. § 5C1.2(a); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(0 (2000).
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(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury
to any person;
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or
supervisor of others in the offense... ; and
(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the
defendant has truthfully provided to the government all
information and evidence the defendant has concerning
the offense or offenses that werepart ofthe same course
of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact
that the defendant has no relevant or useful other
information to provide or that the Government is already
aware of the information shall not preclude a
determination by the court that the defendant has
complied with this requirement.95
The first four of these requirements are straightforward-society does not
want to give a break to those with extensive criminal histories,96 who were
violent and/or caused physical harm,97 or who played a leadership role in the
offense.98 However, the requirement that the defendant provide information to
the government does not fit the same mold of excluding those whose crime
should bar a break from mandatory sentencing. Rather, it promotes the same
goal as section 5K1.1: to encourage defendants to provide information to the
government as part of the sentencing process.
The "safety valve" was not a part of the Guidelines until it was created by
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994." It is generally
accepted that this step was taken as a reaction to widespread criticism of the
mandatory minimum sentences in drug cases. 00 However, with the break
provided to the defendant, something had to be demanded from that defendant,
and that something was the truth. Thus, as a new route around the restrictive
mandatory minimums was created, the safety valve provision joined the only
other section allowing such an escape from the minimums, section 5K 1.1, in
demanding that this break only be given where the defendant has provided
information in his possession. Clearly, the process goal of truth-telling
established with the inception of the Guidelines in 1987 was furthered by the
Sentencing Commission with this amendment in 1994.

95. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.2(a)(1)-(5) (2001) (emphasis added).
96. See id. § 5CI.2(a)(1).
97. See id. § 5C1.2(a)(2)-(3).
98. See id. § 5C1.2(a)(4).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(0 (2000).
100. Celesta A. Albonetti, The Effects of the "Safety Valve " Amendment on Length of
Imprisonment for Cocaine Trafficking/ManufacturingOffenders: Mitigating the Effects of
Mandatory Minimum Penaltiesand Offender's Ethnicity, 87 IOWA L. REv. 401, 406 (2002).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol54/iss3/5

18

Osler: Must Have Got Lost: Traditional Sentencing Goals, the False Trail

MUST HAVE GOT LOST

2003]

4. The Truth Requirementfor "Acceptance ofResponsibility"
Section 3El.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides two levels of
downward adjustment for "acceptance ofresponsiblity": atwo-point reduction
when the defendant "clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his
offense,"10 1 and an additional one-point reduction when the offense level is at
least sixteen and the defendant provides "complete information to the
government concerning his own involvement in the offense,""1 2 or "timely"
notifies the government of his intent to plead guilty.'0 3
Oddly, as the application notes to section 3E1.1 reflect, this decrease is
intended to be a reward for pleading guilty, not for giving information: "This
adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to
its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is
convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse. '' 104 From an
efficiency perspective, this makes sense-the court system is obviously made
more efficient if trials are avoided by guilty pleas,'0 5 allowing each judge to
handle more cases.' 0 6 So, why not simply describe the downward adjustment
as applying when the defendant has timely pled guilty? Justice Breyer, a
member of the original sentencing commission, succinctly recalled why that
commission did not provide such a simple directive:
The Commission's data reveals that a defendant who pleads
guilty will typically receive a sentence reduced by thirty to
forty percent. A Guideline system that reflects actual past
practice should provide such a reduction. Yet, to explicitly
write a reduction into the Guidelines based on a guilty plea is
to explicitly tell a defendant that a guilty plea means a lower
that insistence upon a jury trial means a higher
sentence and
07
sentence. 1
Rather than make clear that the waiver of a constitutional right will be
rewarded and exercise of that right will be punished, Breyer states that the
Commission decided to avoid the issue and leave the definition of acceptance

101. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3El.1(a) (2001).
102. Id. § 3E1.l(b)(1).

103. Id. § 3EL.1(b)(2).
104. Id. § 3E1 1, cmt. n.2. An exception is made when a defendant goes to trial to preserve
an issue which does not relate to factual guilt, such as to challenge a statute. Id.
105. See Matthew Richardson, Specific Crime vs. Criminal Ways: Criminal Conduct and
Responsibility in Rule 3EL.1, 54 VAND. L. REv. 205, 206 (2001).
106. As noted earlier, this project has apparently been successful, as now fewer than five
percent of criminal defendants go to trial. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Federal Sentencing
Statistics by State, District & Circuit, (2000), Mode of Conviction by PrimaryOffense Category,
http://www.ussc.gov/JUDPACK/JP2000.htm.
107. Breyer, supra note 34, at 28.
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of responsibility "vague."' 8 However, to practitioners the meaning is not
vague. In nearly all cases, acceptance of responsibility equals a guilty plea. °9
In those few cases when this equation does not hold, it is usually when the
defendant pleads guilty and then is denied the adjustment because he continues
some false assertion."' Obviously, the Guidelines are playing hide-the-ball in
directing an automatic trial penalty."'
What is interesting in the context of this Article is the form the Guideline
writers use. While the true meaning of the section is buried in the application
notes, the Guideline provision sets out that the reward is provided for the
acceptance of responsibility (an affirmative statement of truth) and,
additionally, for providing information to the government. As with section
5C1.2, described above, when the Guidelines want to extract some price, it
does so in the form of demanding information from the defendant as part of the
sentencing process, further establishing the importance of the process goal of
truth. Again, this goal is pursued not only at the expense of the traditional
goals, which suffer in comparison, but also at the expense of two core values
ofjustice: the honest expression of the bases for a given sentence and the right
of the defendant not to be a witness against himself."2
5. The "Relevant Conduct" Incentive to Bring Out Facts at
Sentencing
Another compromise wrought by the Guideline authors was between "real
offense" and "charge offense" sentencing. "' Real offense sentencing bases the

sentence on "the actual conduct in which the defendant engaged regardless of
the charges for which he was indicted or convicted."'"' In contrast, charge
offense sentencing bases the sentence only "upon the conduct that constitutes
the elements of the offense for which the defendant was charged and of which
' 5
he was convicted."
The result of this compromise is embodied in Guideline section 1B1.3,
which allows the defendant to be sentenced for "all acts and omissions
committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or
willfully caused by the defendant, ' even when the defendant was not charged

108. Id.at 29.
109. See Michael M. O'Hear, Remorse, Cooperation,and "Acceptance ofResponsibility
The Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1507, 1510 (1997).
110. Id. (citing United States v. Echevarria, 33 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 1994)).
111. See id. at 1553-54.
112. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
113. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A4(a) (2001).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. § IB1.3(a)(1)(A).
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with that conduct, or when the defendant has been acquitted of such conduct. 7
For example, a defendant who pleads guilty to distributing 2.5 grams of heroin
may be sentenced for over one kilogram of heroin-400 times as much-based
solely on evidence presented to the judge at sentencing'18 (provided that the
resulting sentence is not above the statutory cap)." 9 As in pre-Guideline
cases, 21 the presentation of this evidence is not subject to the rules of
evidence,' 12 meaning that hearsay, for example, is allowed. Further, rather than
carrying the burden of proving facts beyond a reasonable doubt, the
government must only prove at sentencing that purported facts are more likely
true than not.'22 The cumulative result, at least in some circuits, is that a
sentence can be greatly increased, beyond what was pled guilty to or proven at
hearsay contained in the
trial, based on nothing more than unsubstantiated
23
judge.
the
to
presented
report
presentence
The ability of a court to rely on such evidence to show relevant conduct
and greatly change a sentence without departing from the Guidelines has been
subjected to withering criticism. One critique asserts that the ability to consider
facts broadly at sentencing comes from a time before the Guidelines, when
2
rehabilitation was an active goal and there was no appeal of sentences, '
meaning that a broad scope would often play to the benefit of the defendant,
not the government. The (pre-Guidelines) 1949 Supreme Court opinion in
Williams v. New York, which approved broad consideration of facts at
sentencing, 25 was premised on the need for such information to craft a
rehabilitative sentence. 26 The obfuscation of rehabilitation (along with the

117.
118.
119.
120.

United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997).
United States v. Cooper, 274 F.3d 230, 236 (5th Cir. 2001).
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000).
See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).

121. FED. R. EvID. 1101(d)(3) (stating that the rules do not apply at sentencing).
122. This was true both before the Guidelines, McMillan v. Pennsylvania,477 U.S. 79,91

(1986), and after, Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 247-48 (1998) (citing
Watts, 519 U.S. at 156-57).

123. See, e.g., United States v. Atkins, 250 F.3d 1203, 1212-14 (8th Cir. 2001) ("the court
may consider criminal activity for which the defendant has not been prosecuted"); United States
v. Riley, 142 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11 th Cir. 1998) (finding that the district court may consider any
reliable information at sentencing); United States v. McLymont, No. 94-5042, No. 94-5043, 1995
U.S. App. LEXIS 22682, at * 12-13 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 1995) (per curiam) (noting that a court is

not precluded from relying on hearsay in sentencing); United States v. Ponce, 917 F.2d 846, 84749 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that a sentencing court may base its sentence on undisputed findings
in defendant's presentence report). But see United States v. Corral, 172 F.3d 714, 716-17 (9th
Cir. 1999) (vacating sentence where district court relied on hearsay quoted in the presentence
reports).
124. Freed, supra note 10, at 1712-13.
125. 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).

126. See Federal Rules of Evidence Committee of the American College of Trial Lawyers,
The Law of Evidence in FederalSentencing Proceedings,177 F.R.D. 513, 523 (1998).
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other traditional goals of sentencing) with the coming of the Guidelines, some
argue, makes the relevant conduct rule archaic.' 27
A second critique argues that the rule announced by the Supreme Court in
Apprendi v. New Jersey'28 (requiring a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt
as to key facts) should apply not only to factual determinations that raise the
statutory maximum, but also to those that merely raise the guideline range for
an offense-meaning that if the government wants to use what is now
considered relevant conduct to increase a sentence under the Guidelines, it must
prove those facts to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."'
Finally, as Dan Freed has pointed out, this doctrine "allows a prosecutor
to increase an offender's sentence more easily by dropping charges than by
bringing them."'"3 That is, by deferring evidence of that act to sentencing, a
prosecutor will enjoy a much lower burden of proof, the ability to use hearsay,
freedom from the rules of evidence, and, if she plays her cards right and the
probation officer includes her information in his report, the possibility of
getting the higher sentence imposed while placing no evidence before the judge
at all. This perverse incentive, according to Freed, leads to a reduction of
"visibility and candor in sentencing..'.. Further, he argues that the varying
practices between districts in approaching relevant conduct undermines even
32
the Guidelines' stated purpose of uniformity.
This chorus of criticism is one I now join. In addition to all that others have
accurately observed, the relevant conduct provision furthers the corrosive effect
of promoting fact-gathering as a function of sentencing rather than trial. As
Freed notes, the current relevant conduct rule has created strong incentives for
the prosecutor to dodge trial and instead bring facts at sentencing. " There are
judicial incentives too. Because the relevant conduct rule tends to make
criminal justice more efficient (at least in terms of time spent per case), it may
be attractive to time-pressed judges. The cost of this efficiency though, in the
long view, is high-it further saturates the court with sentencing process and
obscures the traditional individual outcome goals of sentencing.
Ironically, as the sentencing process becomes more important relative to
trials, the more it loses its true purpose of actually doing something to the
offender that will exact a cost or change something in the future. In becoming
a captive of such a self-fulfilling process at the precise time they should be
evaluating the defendant and the outcome, judges (and the system of criminal

127. Freed, supra note 10, at 1712-13.
128. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
129. Freya Russell, Casenote, Limiting the Use ofAcquitted and UnchargedConduct at
Sentencing: Apprendi v. New Jersey andIts Effect on the Relevant Conduct Provision of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1199, 1224 (2001).
130. Freed, supra note 10, at 1714.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1715.
133. Id. at 1714.
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justice they serve) lose the ability to affirmatively change the lives of
individuals and communities.
C. Into the Future: Victims'Rights as a Goal ofSentencing

As described above, fact-gathering and truth-telling have become a goal of
sentencing in subtle ways-as a continuation of past practice despite new
realities, as part of compromises, and as a handy tool where some "price"
needed to be extracted. Through this evolutionary development, fact-gathering
and truth-telling have come to dominate the process of sentencing and have
become a goal in themselves. Standing in stark contrast to this subtle evolution
of great importance is the recently proclaimed goal that victims should be made
a part of the sentencing process.
Like the emerging goal of truth-telling, creating a role for victim rights is
a process goal, as it is fulfilled prior to the sentence being issued. However, the
campaign to incorporate victim participation into the sentencing process has not
been subtle; rather, it has been proposed and promoted with great fanfare."'
While fact-gathering has been pursued for a variety of reasons, most of them
more practical than ideological, advocates for allowing a role for victims in the
sentencing process are motivated by a single principle-victims should have
a voice in the proceedings, as their value is at least equal to that of the
defendant.'3 5
It is hard to deny the political appeal of granting advantages to those who
have been victimized by criminals. Commonly, calls for greater participation
by victims in sentencing include the arguments that crime victims are often
victimized a second time by the justice system 36 and that the judicial system
overwhelmingly favors the defendant over the victim.'37 These arguments have
been heard. It has been predicted that the next amendment to the United States
Constitution will be a Victim's Rights Amendment, 38
' and in a previous attempt

134. Paul G. Cassell, Barbariansat the Gates?A Reply to the Criticsofthe Victims'Rights
Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 479, 479-80.
135. A statement by the Law Enforcement Alliance of America in support of the
Constitutional amendment claimed that "[a] federal constitutional change is necessary because
if defendant's rights are guaranteed under the Constitution and victims' rights are only specified
in statutes, the right of the accused will always prevail-victims will always be seen by our
justice system as second class- citizens [sic]." The Victims 'Rights Amendment: Hearingon H.R.
J Res. 64 Before the House Comm. on the Constitution, 106th Cong. 39-41 (2000) (statement
of Christine Long, Member of the Board of Directors and Chairperson of Victims' Rights
Committee, Law Enforcement Alliance ofAmerica, Inc.), quoted in Rachel King, Why a Victims'
Rights ConstitutionalAmendment Is a BadIdea: PracticalExperiencesfrom Crime Victims, 68
U. CIN. L. REv. 357, 361-62 (2000).
136. See Kathleen Kalaher, Note, The Proposed Victim's Rights Amendment: Taking a Bite
Out of Crime or a Dog With No Teeth?, 22 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 317, 317-18 (1997).
137. See Katie Long, Note, Community Input at Sentencing: Victim's Right or Victim 's
Revenge?, 75 B.U. L. REv. 187, 190-91 (1995).
138. Cassell, supra note 134, at 479-80.
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at passage, this amendment won the support of President Clinton13 9 and some
measure of bipartisan support in Congress.' 40
The proposed Amendment would grant crime victims the right to receive
notice of hearings, to attend those hearings, and both to speak and present
written statements at pretrial detention hearings, pleas, and sentencing. 141
Already on the books in the federal system is the codification of the Victim's
Rights and Restitution Act of 1990,142 which directs government employees to
accord crime victims the following rights:
(1) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect ....
(2) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused
offender.
(3) The right to be notified of court proceedings.
(4) The right to be present at all public court proceedings
related to the offense [with exceptions] ....
(5) The right to confer with attorney for the Government in
the case.' 3
Clearly, these proposed and actual laws' 44 attempt to affect the process of
sentencing. Significantly, they give everyone more to do in the course of the
sentencing process at the expense of a focus on the outcome.
For example, the federal prosecutor is now directed by law to provide
notification of plea hearings, trials, and sentencings to victims. 4 This seems
simple until one ponders the scope of this task. For example, a mail-order fraud
could affect thousands of victims. The seemingly simple act by the prosecutor
or member of the staff of notifying those victims is time previously spent doing
something else.

139. Id. at 479; Robert P. Mosteller, Victims' Rights and the Constitution: Moving from
GuaranteeingParticipatoryRights to Benefiting the Prosecution,29 ST. MARY'sL.J. 1053, 1053

(1998).
140. Cassell, supra note 134, at 479.
141. S.J. Res. 65, 104th Cong. § 1 (1996). The proposed amendment specifically provides:
Victims of crimes of violence and other crimes that Congress and the States
may define by law ... shall have the rights to notice of and not to be
excluded from all public proceedings relating to the crime; to be heard if

present and to submit a statement at a public pre-trial or trial proceeding to
determine a release from custody, an acceptance of a negotiated plea, or a

sentence ....Id.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 10606 (2000).
143. Id. § 10606(b). Notably, the statute expressly states that it "does not create a cause

of action" for any person. Id. § 10606(c).
144. Some states have laws analogous to 42 U.S.C. § 10606. For example, Texas offers the
same right to notification and attendance. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.02 (Vernon 2003).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 10606(b)(3).
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The legal requirement that the victim be able to "confer" with the
prosecutor 146 raises a new danger, as well: that the victim will become the
"client" of the prosecutor, undercutting the ideal of public prosecution in the
United States, in which the prosecutor traditionally is viewed as representing
the cause of justice rather than any one individual. 147
While having the
prosecutor stand in the shoes of the victim may further the traditional individual
outcome goal of retribution,'48 it is hard to see how such a standpoint of
advocacy would serve any other goal.
Having to consult with the victim in the course of negotiating an outcome,
at any rate, would distract the prosecutor from pursuing the traditional outcome
goals. 149 The proposed amendment would also further load the plate of the
sentencing judge, who must incorporate the victim into the sentencing hearing,
either in person or through the submission of a victim impact statement. This
serves as a distraction from the traditional outcome goals in two ways: First,
it requires more process for the court to administer rather than attending to the
individual importance of the outcome. More importantly, it introduces a third
voice into the discussion of a constructive sentence-a third voice which,
because of its victimhood, can be compelling and even heartwrenching, but
which more often than not will have no interest in the traditional goals other
than retribution.
Thus, despite its principled basis in sad historical fact, the victim's rights
movement further imperils the traditional goals of sentencing in that it tends,
by its nature, to serve only the goal of retribution. Thus, a greater role for
victims would exacerbate a trend decried by judges and academics alike, many
of whom already feel that the federal sentencing regime has become overly
focused on retribution with the collapse of rehabilitation as a central focus of
sentencing. 50
Because the current federal statute has no teeth (lacking any cause of action
for a violation),"'5 and the Constitutional Amendment is still unrealized, the role
of victims' participation in federal cases has yet to be fully developed.

146. Id. § 10606(b)(5).
147. Alice Koskela, Comment, Victim's Rights Amendments: An IrresistiblePolitical
Force Transforms the CriminalJustice System, 34 IDAHo L. REV. 157, 179 (1997).
148. Phillip A. Talbert, Comment, The Relevance of Victim Impact Statements to the
CriminalSentencing Decision, 36 UCLA L. REV. 199, 212 (1988).

149. Of course, the success of the prosecution may sometimes rest on the prosecutor
ignoring the victim. For example, the victim may want to confront the defendant with facts prior
to trial, when that would not be in the best interests of the government's case. Lynne Henderson,
Revisiting Victim's Rights, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 383, 423.

150. See STIn & CABRANEs, supra note 3, at 29-37.
151. See 42 U.S.C. § 10606(c).
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III. COMMISSIONERS, JUDGES, AND PROSECUTORS IN THE MODERN ERA

Like the powerless Queen of England addressing Parliament, the traditional
goals of retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation in federal
sentencing have only a vestigal role, leaving behind only the thin wisp of an
empty claim that they are the true goals of the Guidelines.152 In their place is a
stem commitment to superficial uniformity,'53 a quiet fealty to the cause of
efficiency through the avoidance of trial and the shift of truth-finding to
sentencing, and the toothless promise that victims can be a part of the
sentencing process.
However, to fully understand the current state of federal sentencing, we
also must understand the goals that the Guidelines set out for each participant
in the criminal justice system. Sentencing commissioners, judges, and
prosecutors have each been given a job to do by the current sentencing regime,
and in each case, that job has little to do with the larger cause of justice.
A. Stasis and the GoalsAssigned the Sentencing Commission
In short, the Sentencing Commission is beholden to their own creation. At
first, in creating the Guidelines, the Commission worked with coarse, bold
strokes, often with broad compromises designed to avoid conflict between the
commissioners. 154 For example, instead of basing the guidelines on either
retribution or deterrence, the Commission elected to codify the broad
sentencing trends that already existed rather than pursue an articulable
philosophy or sentencing goal. 5 ' They created, prior to the inception of the
Guidelines era in 1987, the giant book with which federal practitioners are now
familiar, replete with thousands of instructions.'5 6 This first Guidelines Manual
was over 200 pages long and established the 258-box sentencing grid which
remains at the heart of federal sentencing. 157 This tome sent the message that
judges were no longer important, at least in their ancient role as the arbiters
rather than the calculators of justice.'

152. U.S. SENTENCING

GUIDELINES MANUAL § I A (200 1).
153. The project of creating uniformity has been undermined by continuing disparities
between state and federal sentences for the same crime. For example, federal prison time for drug
and gun offenses is an average of three times longer than those served in state systems. Michael
M. O'Hear, National Uniformity/Local Uniformity: Reconsidering the Use of Departures to
Reduce Federal-StateSentencing Disparities,87 IOWA L. REV. 721, 731-32 (2002).
154. See Breyer, supra note 34, at 15.
155. See id.
at 16-18.
156. The complexity of these rules is shown by the fact that even after fifteen years, "issues
of first impression involving application of the Guidelines continue to be presented ..."Stacey
M. Studnicki, Annual Sixth CircuitSurvey: FederalSentencing Guidelines, 2002 L. REV. MICH.

ST. U. DET. C.L. 573, 601, availableat WL 2002 LRMSUDCL 573.

157. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1987).
158. See Douglas A. Berman, A Common Lawfor This Age ofFederalSentencing: The
Opportunity and Needfor JudicialLawmaking, 1ISTAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 93, 101 (1999).
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With the mammoth sculpture now in place, the Commission's subsequent
role was simply to refine the image presented. In the words of Justice Breyer,
"[T]he system is 'evolutionary'-the Commission issues Guidelines, gathers
data from actual practice, analyzes the data, and revises the Guidelines over
time."

59

This process of slow evolution is exactly what has occurred. In fact, due
to political problems, this evolution may have been even slower than the
original Commission expected. 60 Most years, the Commission will adjust the
toughen up the
penalties for certain crimes; for example, the Commission' may
6
penalties for the narcotic viewed as the "next big threat."' 1
What has not occurred is any revolutionary change, such as a revisiting of
the compromises in the founding document of the Guidelines regime, an
incorporation of common law sentencing principles,1 62 or a thorough
simplification of the sentencing grid.'63 The very mass of the Guidelines
Manual, it seems, is a brake on such revolutionary reforms and continues to
define the role and the goals of the Sentencing Commission, much more than
the original mandates given the Commission by Congress. 64 Realistically, if
change is to occur, it must be within the process already directed by the
Guidelines: determine the appropriate Guideline, 165make adjustments," group
169
68
multiple counts, 167 determine criminal history, find the Guideline range,
and consider departures. " I have kept this in mind in drafting my own
proposals.' 7'
B. The Goals Assigned to Judges Under the Guidelines
While some point out that federal judges have retained the ability to
exercise discretion within the 25% ranges allowed within the sentencing grid,'72

159. Breyer, supra note 34, at 8.
160. The failure to appoint commissioners to the Commission in the mid-1990's slowed
down activity considerably. William H. Rhenquist, The 1998 Year-End Report of the Federal
Judiciary, II FED. SENTENCING REP. 134, 134-35 (1998).
161. For example, in 2001, the Commission increased the penalties relating to ecstasy,
pursuant to an express mandate from Congress. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1,
highlights 2001 amend. (2001).
162. Freed, supra note 10, at 1750.
163. Id. at 1751.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See supra Part II.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IB1.l(a)-(b) (2001).

Id. § IB1.I(c), (e).
Id. § IBl.l(d).
Id. § IBI.l(f).
Id. § IBl.l(g).
Id. § 1Bl.l(i).
See infra Part IV.
Berman, supra note 158, at 102.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

27

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54: 649

the judges themselves seem to see this as a small consolation.173 In 1993, nearly
half of the federal judges had seen enough and wanted to "scrap" the
Guidelines altogether. In 1997, three-fourths of the federal trial judges felt that
such mandatory guidelines were "unnecessary."' 74 One district judge reported

that in four years on the bench, he had "yet to meet a district court judge who
was ready to admit that he or she had anything good to say about the
7
Guidelines.'
Such hostility is no doubt attributable to the goals assigned to judges in the
Guideline regime. Limited in their ability to structure a sentence, they are left
with other directives by the Guidelines. Primarily, judges are to follow the
formulaic process set out in section 1B 1.1. Secondarily, as described above,
they are the tool by which other process goals are achieved, such as the shift of
truth-finding to sentencing, another goal embedded in process. 7 "
The problem is that federal district judges are not suited, by qualification
or temperament, to be process-minders. First, they generally are chosen for
their positions after a successful career that likely involved a great deal of
discretionary power-as a law firm partner, a federal prosecutor, a defense
attorney, or a state court judge, for example.177 In these prior roles, they have
honed their ability to size up people, to make decisions based on a complex set
of factors, and to lead based on principle. Few, if any, come from the
occupations which would more perfectly prepare them for plodding through the
Guideline sentencing process-that of tax preparer or writer of situation
comedies, perhaps, where the simple ability to follow a formula is paramount.
Is it surprising, then, that they chafe under the Guidelines, which direct them
to follow a process rather than craft an outcome?
Second, judges are trained in the law, a discipline which ingrains beliefs
that are contrary to the rote following of a formula. When that education does
focus on a system of strict rules, such as the tax code, very often the focus of
their learning is on finding advantageous exceptions to the rules therein. And,
of course, they have been specifically trained to consider the subtle
complexities of seeking retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and
incapacitation in sentencing, for even today, textbooks identify these as the
goals of sentencing. 7 1 So, again, is it surprising that judges reject the role of
number-cruncher assigned them by the Guidelines?

173. In fact, over 200 federal trial judges found the Guidelines to be unconstitutional
before that issue was resolved to the contrary by the Supreme Court in UnitedStates v. Mistretta,

488 U.S. 361 (1989). U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N ANNUAL REPORT (1989).
174. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 5.
175. Stewart Dalzell, One Cheer For the Guidelines, 40 VILL. L REv. 317, 320 (1995).

176. See supra Part II.
177. The biographies of federal judges accessible on the Federal Judicial Center's web site
confirm this assertion, http://www.fjc.gov.
178. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAW 19 (3d ed. 2001).
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C. The Troubling Goals Given to Prosecutorsand Agents
By giving prosecutors the sole authority to move for a downward departure
under section 5Kl.1, increasing the importance of charge pleading and
allowing the prosecutor to control what relevant conduct is put before the court,
the Guidelines have shifted power from judges to prosecutors 179 (and, in turn,
to the law-enforcement agents who exercise discretion prior to and in
partnership with the prosecutors). Starting from the premise that the
prosecution team has been given more power by the Guidelines, the goals the
Guidelines establish for prosecutors and agents deserve examination.
Certainly, it is impossible to have a single answer to this question.
Prosecutors and agents have a wide variety of central motivating philosophies.
Some believe in crime-control and will focus their efforts on arresting those
"key men" without whom criminal networks do not work.' ° Others seek
simply to enforce the criminal code, prosecuting evenly any who are brought
to them. However, some are probably after "low-hanging fruit"-wanting to
get the longest sentence'' with the least effort.1 2 While I do not claim that
most law enforcement officials have this view, at least some do want to lock up
as many criminals as possible for as long as possible.' 83 It is in respect to this
last group that the incentives offered by the Guidelines are most relevant.
The classic example of such low-hanging fruit is the street seller of just
over five grams' 84of crack cocaine.' 85 Even with no criminal history
whatsoever, the Guidelines' 86 (and the statutory minimum) 87 will result in a

179. See supra Part II.
180. For example, the key man in a fencing ring might be the one who finances the
purchases ofstolen goods and launders the proceeds. Incapacitating this person will more likely
disable the fencing ring than arresting the person at the counter.
181. It is beyond dispute that the Guidelines, on their face, establish a normative ordering
of the importance of crimes. The starkest example of this is the sentencing grid itself. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (2001).
182. I make no pretense of knowing what proportion of prosecutors or agents can be
described this way. However, for some agents and prosecutors, low-hanging fruit must be very
attractive. Those cases move faster, meaning that one person can process more cases, a factor
which may be rewarded in pay and advancement. More subtle effects are at work, too; for
example, press releases are often issued after a sentencing that lists the prosecutor, agent, and
certainly a description of the sentence. Also, length of sentence is a simple, quantitative way to
judge a prosecutor's or agent's success.
183. Curtis R. Blakely & Vic W. Bumphus, American Criminal Justice Philosophy:
What's Old-What's New?, FED. PROBATION, June 1999, at 62-64; Marcia Chambers,
Unwelcome Blurring of Boundaries,NAT'L L.J., Sept. 30, 1991, at 17 (discussing training of
agents in sentencing in order to control apprehension and punishment of officers); William J.
Stuntz, The PathologicalPoliticsof Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505, 537-39 (2001).
184. As a point of reference, a packet of coffee sweetener is one gram.
185. The Sentencing Guidelines, like the controlling statute, refer to crack as "cocaine
base." See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL. § 2D1.1 (2001); 21 U.S.C. § 841.
186. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2DI.1 (c)(7).
187. The statutory minimum is five years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(B)(iii) (2000).
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sentence of sixty-three to seventy-eight months after trial."'8 And how hard is
it to catch this street-level seller? It is pretty quick work, actually-the entire
case may easily be made by an agent walking up to the defendant on the street
and buying the crack.' 89 Other times, agents will make a series of small
purchases until they get to the sentencing threshold.' 90 At any rate, the street
purchase of five grams of crack is a quick and easy case which produces a
higher sentence than one in which a similar defendant with no criminal history
sells 450 grams of powder cocaine, 19 ' pimps his own child as a nine-year-old
prostitute, 92 kills someone in a voluntary manslaughter,'93 dumps a truckload
of toxic waste knowing it will harm people, 194 or steals $6 million.' 95
Obviously, it takes a lot more effort to catch and prosecute the perpetrators
of these other crimes than to make a simple buy from the street seller of crack.
But as the Guidelines are currently constituted,' 96 the length of sentence creates
the incentive to go after that street-level seller rather than another offender.
Even within the realm of the war on drugs, these incentives are
counterproductive. For example, until converted at the street level, crack is just
powder cocaine. When cut with baking powder, the 450 grams of powder,
which resulted in a lesser sentence, is actually going to hit the street as at least
a kilogram (1,000 grams) of crack cocaine. In many cases, the way to stop
crack from reaching the streets would be to create incentives for the
government to get the cocaine before it is made into crack-precisely the
reverse of the incentives offered by the Guidelines. While the best approach to
crime control would be to have the Guidelines provide an incentive to get the

188. The offense level under section 2D1.1(c)(7) is twenty-six, and the criminal history
category with no offenses is I, resulting in a range of sixty-three to seventy-eight months. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 5A (2001).

189. The elements of distribution of narcotics are simple: The defendant must distribute
to another what he knows to be narcotics. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1). A single transaction can easily
show these elements within the span of a few moments.
190. Robert L. Steinback, Sentencing Rules DistortLogic of CourtSystem, MIAMI HERALD,
July 16, 1993, at IB (describing how an undercover agent made seven purchases to reach a fifty
gram threshold).
191. Fifty-one to sixty-three months, at an offense level of twenty-four and a criminal
history of I. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2D1. 1(c)(8), 5A (2001).
192. Fifty-seven to seventy-one months, at an offense level of twenty-five and a criminal
history of I. Id. §§ 2G1.l(a)(l), (b)(2)(A), (b)(3)(A), 5A.
193. Fifty-seven to seventy-one months, at an offense level of twenty-five and a criminal
history of 1.Id. §§ 2A1.3(a), 5A (2001).
194. Fifty-one to sixty-three months, at an offense level of twenty-four and a criminal
history ofl. Id. §§ 2Q1.1(a), 5A.
195. Fifty-one to sixty-three months, at an offense level of twenty-four and a criminal
history ofl. Id. §§ 2B1 .l(a), (b)(l)(J), 5A.
196. Proposed changes to the Guidelines are outlined on the Sentencing Commission web
site, http://www.ussc.gov/guidelin.htm.
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key man, they instead provide an incentive to incapacitate the guy who is most
easily replaced.197
Nor is crack the only example of such low-hanging fruit. The Guideline
ranges for relatively small amounts of methamphetamine. 95 and for a felon in
possession of a firearm199 similarly offer the same combination: Little effort by

law enforcement to make a case and a high penalty create an incentive to
incapacitate someone regardless of whether this will deter future crime. Those
convicted of these offenses are most likely at the bottom of a chain of
criminality, if part of one at all.
By abandoning the traditional goals of sentencing and instead creating a
directive to judges regarding each and every sentence, we have invited the
forces of politics to create perverse goals of sentencing for those given the most
power-prosecutors and agents. The result, for the time being at least, is a
regime in which those who distribute small amounts of drugs or who possess
a firearm, and thereby pose a threat to hurt others, receive higher sentences
than those who have hurt others, whether by selling a child into prostitution, by
killing someone in a dispute, by poisoning our water, or by stealing millions of
dollars from the public.
IV. THE WAY BACK HOME

Few have risen to defend the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and even
those who have come to its defense have acknowledged the problems that lurk
within the manual. 200 However, it should be defended in some respects. Most
197. The crack trade is a business. Within that business, powder cocaine is usually
converted to crack on stoves by people at the bottom rungs of the organization. A fair analogy

is to a neighborhood bagel store which is part of a national chain. Walk into that shop and you
will see relatively low-paid employees making and selling the bagels. That is, they convert the
dough shipped to the store in bulk into the end product, bagels. Look closely and you will see
that the business is structured such that these low-paid workers can be easily replaced in the

inevitable event the store suffers high turnover. The instructions to make the bagels are posted
on the wall, the process is kept simple, and jobs are specialized to limit the amount of skill
needed. If you wanted to close down that bagel shop, it would be futile to address the problem
by arresting the counter help and bagel makers because the shop is structured for them to be
easily replaced. Rather, one would have to incapacitate the key men and women in the
chain-those who controlled logistics, financing, or management through specialized skills not
so easily replaced.
198. For example, distribution of five grams of methamphetamine (actual weight) results
in the same sentence as distribution of five grams of crack. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2D1.1(c)(7) (2001).

199. Similarly, the simple possession of three handguns by a person previously convicted
of two minor narcotics distributions would result in the same sentence as distribution of five
grams of crack. See id. § 2K2.1.

200. See generallyFrank 0. Bowman, III, The Quality ofMercy Must Be Restrained,and
Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 679
(turning back criticism of the Guidelines, but acknowledging some problems with the current
system); Thomas N. Whiteside, The Reality of FederalSentencing: Beyond the Criticism, 91
Nw. U. L. REv. 1574 (1997) (same).
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importantly, it does provide a generally fair baseline for judges, especially new
judges, to use in coming up with a sentence. As one relatively new district
judge reflected, "[u]nder the guidelines the SRA ordains, I find myself in the
familiar world of applying readily ascertainable law in carrying out what is
unquestionably my most solemn duty."' ° To its credit, this baseline is national,
rather than based in the culture of a locality.
A.

The Costs ofAbandoning Our TraditionalGoals

There have been significant costs incurred by abandoning the sentencing
goals of retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation, in favor of
the new goals of uniformity and process-following. As described above, we
now have a largely reactive Sentencing Commission laden with its own
creation," 2 angry judges willing to subvert the guidelines, 2 3 prosecutors and
agents handed an often-bizarre and counter-productive set of incentives to fight
crime, 2 4 and a generation of defendants and victims who did not benefit from
the accumulated wisdom of the traditional goals.
How far astray are we? Pretty far, both in pursuing efficiency through the
shift of fact-finding to sentencing (at the expense of the traditional goals) and
by favoring the goal of uniformity to the detriment of individual consideration.
Part II described at length the many ways in which the sentencing scheme
now in place provides incentives for fact-finding to occur within the sentencing
process-through a defendant's cooperation with the government, admissions
made to get the benefit of the "safety valve" provision, and admission of
responsibility, and through the government's relevant conduct. In each case,
these choices seem to be made in the interests of the efficiency of the criminal
justice system-by increasing the number of pleas and decreasing the number
of trials. Given that this has been accomplished at the cost of the individual
consideration and attendant attention to the traditional sentencing goals
formerly given each case (to say nothing of the individual rights lost when facts
are proven at the lower standard before the judge, rather than beyond a
reasonable doubt before the jury), we have to ask ourselves-is it worth it?
Maybe it is not. After all, we are abandoning principles of sentencing that
stretch beyond the founding of our Republic and which provided the context
for the Constitution's rules relating to criminal law. As the Supreme Court has
said:
The choices we discern as having been made in the
Constitutional Convention impose burdens on governmental
processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even

201.
202.
203.
204.

Dalzell, supra note 175, at 323.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.C.
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unworkable, but those hard choices were consciously made
by men who had lived under a form of government that
permitted arbitrary governmental acts to go unchecked. 0 5
Of course, those men did not choose to remove from the hands of judges
their ability to look to the future in each individual case and consider an
outcome in the form of a sentence that would serve society's goals. Inefficient
though it may be, they allowed that process, and the goals it served, to stand.
It is only now that the focus on individual outcomes has been subsumed by the
need for efficiency.
Perhaps even more than the drive for efficiency, the workings of the
Guidelines are motivated by a desire to convert individually-considered
defendants into a more uniform group of sentences. In other words, defendants
are transformed from people into statistics, as members of the class of people
with somewhat similar crimes. 0 6

Notably, at the same time that the idea of the Guidelines was coming to
fruition (with its strict limits on the consideration of particularized
circumstances of the defendant), the United States Supreme Court ruled that
sentencers in death penalty cases must be allowed to consider "particularized
mitigating factors.

20 7

In fact, in the same year the Guidelines came into place

(1987), the Supreme Court precisely held that mandatory sentences were
unconstitutional in the death penalty context, as they did not allow for
individualized consideration of the defendant and her background.208 Thus, we
were moving in both directions at the same time in sentencing-towards
particularized consideration in death penalty cases and away from
particularized consideration in other federal cases.20 9

The effects of this transition from a focus on individual outcomes to
number-crunching can be seen in courtrooms-as a defendant is being
205. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
206. In fact, this was the conclusion of some of the more eloquent district court decisions
finding the Sentencing Guidelines to be unconstitutional prior to the issue being settled to the
contrary by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., United States v. Alafriz, 690 F. Supp. 1303, 1309-11
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("Under the Guidelines, however, the due process clause is violated because
each defendant is considered only as a member of a class ....); United States v. Brittman, 687
F. Supp. 1324, 1354-57 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (holding that the Guidelines violate Separation of
Powers by removing a sphere of judicial discretion and a defendant's due process right to
individualized sentencing); United States v. Frank, 682 F. Supp. 815, 817-19 (W.D. Pa. 1988)
(holding that the Sentencing Guideline procedures do not adequately protect a defendant's due
process rights).
207. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 272 (1976). The principle that individualized
consideration was of primary importance in death penalty sentencing was firmly established in
Woodson v. North Carolina,428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) and Jurek, 428 U.S. at 271-72.
208. Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 77-78 (1987).
209. Some might say this trend is simply because death penalty cases are more important.
That does not address the fact that we express polar opposite values in death and non-death
cases: consistent view would simply be that less individualized consideration is warranted in
non-death penalty cases.
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sentenced, the judge often is looking down at the Guidelines Manual or a bench
memo on the applicable range, rather than into the eyes of the man or woman
whose fate is being announced. Perhaps it is these averted eyes which provide
the most damning evidence of the effects of foregoing the traditional outcome
goals, as assessed by a judge who sits before the defendant, person to person.
B. A New Path
We need to put the traditional goals back in the hands of the sentencing
judges, where they will be vital and relevant. This can be done while
addressing the continuing problems of relevant conduct and the government's
lock on the ability to recommend a departure under Guideline section 5K 1.1 for
cooperation with the government. In short, three steps should be taken: (1) the
Guideline sections relating to departures should be rewritten to allow limited
departures where tied explicitly to facts supporting the fulfillment of at least
two of the traditional goals of sentencing; (2) the relevant conduct provision"'
should be scrapped and replaced with a provision allowing an upward
departure to achieve necessary incapacitation, when tied to facts proven at trial
or sentencing beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) section 5K1.1 should be
amended so that, even in the absence of a government recommendation for a
downward departure, the defense can move for such a departure when the
defendant has cooperated with the government in such a way that the need for
retribution is lessened. In this way, by building the traditional goals into the
actual decisions made by the sentencing court, they will be restored to an active
role in the law.
1. Allowing Limited Departuresto Fulfill the TraditionalGoals
The Guidelines not only fail to encourage departures based on the goals of
retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation, but they also
affirmatively hamper the consideration of these traditional goals. 21' As Doug
Berman has suggested, the traditional goals of sentencing, already described as
"Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence" by the codification of the
Sentencing Reform Act,212 should be described in the Guidelines as "relevant"
when considering a downward or upward departure.213
This would not require a drastic reworking of the Guidelines. Rather, only
a few simple changes would be necessary. First, a new provision should be
added to section 5H stating that "facts used by the court to determine the need
for retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, or incapacitation may be relevant in
determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline

210.
211.
212.
213.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § I B 1.3 (2001).
See supra Part I1.A.2.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).
See Berman, supra note 11, at 107.
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range, unless otherwise barred by these guidelines." In keeping with this,
sections 5H1.1-1.6 (covering age, educational and vocational skills, mental and
emotional conditions, physical condition, employment record, and family and
community ties) should be amended so as to state that such factors "are
relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the guideline
range if used to determine the need for retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation,
or incapacitation."2"4
These changes would allowjudges once again to incorporate the individual
outcome goals into sentencing. To do so would allow judges to be explicit
about their reasons for sentencing, honor their experience and training," 5 and
reduce the degree of subversion of the guidelines that judges currently engage
in to effect those traditional goals.216

On a more fundamental level, these changes would bring the traditional
goals closer to the importance given to the process goal of fact-gathering,
especially as expressed in Guideline section 5K1.1 .217 By allowing some of the
evidence and argument to return to a focus on retribution, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and incapacitation, the present focus on process in sentencing,
including that introduced by the ascendance of fact-gathering and victim
participation, would be muted by the increased importance of those traditional
goals.
Of course, one criticism of these changes will be that they will return to the
system of disparities, which caused the outcry for the Guidelines in the first
place. One response to this charge is simply to point to the literature which
shows that disparities have continued to plague the system even after the advent
of the Guidelines." 8 In fact, studies and commentators appear to be unanimous
on this point.2 9 The disparities persist, including those based on race and

214. Consideration of race, sex, national origin, creed and religion should continue to be
barred from consideration. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H 1.10 (2001). However,
it may be worthwhile to consider allowing judges to consider wealth in some cases to exact
greater retribution from those who gained the most from our society. See supra Part II.A.4.
215. See supra Part III.B.
216. See Berman, supra note 11, at 104.
217. However, it would not allow for full equality with section 5K1l, as the departure
provisions for the traditional goals would not allow for a departure below a mandatory minimum.
218. Some have also suggested that the claim of interjudge disparities prior to the
Guidelines was overstated. Ahmed E. Taha, The EquilibriumEffect ofLegal Rule Changes: Are
the FederalSentencing Guidelines BeingCircumvented?, 21 INT'L REv. L. &ECON. 251,252-53
(2001).
219. See generally Celesta A. Albonetti, Sentencing Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Effects of Defendant Characteristics,Guilty Pleas, and Departureson Sentence
OutcomesforDrugOffenses, 1991-1992, 31 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 789, 790 (1997) (noting that the
federal guidelines reducejudicial discretion, but do not restrict prosecutorial discretion); Michael
S. Gelacak et al., Departures Under the FederalSentencing Guidelines: An Empirical and
JurisprudentialAnalysis, 81 MINN. L. REv. 299, 336-65 (1996) (finding that the disparity in
sentences results in part from differences in jurisprudence among the various federal circuits);
Joseph S. Hall, Rule Jl(e)(1)(C) and the Sentencing Guidelines: Bargaining Outside the
Heartland?,87 IOWA L. REv. 587, 590 (2002) (arguing that current plea bargaining practice
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ethnicity, according to a study of 14,189 defendants convicted of drug
offenses.22 These persistent disparities in the face of facially neutral Guidelines
show the truth of Dan Freed's assertion that a "second, underground level of
221
sentencing seems to be displacing the first, visible level.
This underground level of sentencing is properly called the subversion of
the Guidelines. That is, judges are able to subvert the intent of the Guidelines
by manipulating those areas where some discretion is retained: in judging
relevant conduct and in accepting or rejecting motions for departure,222
especially those under section 5K1.1. Though some may be doing so out of
racial prejudice, far more are likely doing it in the interests of those traditional
goals of sentencing that they learned in law school: retribution, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and incapacitation. 3 Thus, the effects of the suggestions
outlined here will be two-fold. First, they will allow the honest expression of
departures that truly support traditional goals for valid reasons, precluding the
need to hide subversive impulses under other terms. This will have the positive
effect of driving these judgments back aboveground, where they will open to
public view and analysis. Truth in sentencing, in this small way, can become
a reality.
Second, those who sentence out of racial animus or other improper purpose
will lose (through the changes to section 5KI.1 and relevant conduct) the
ability to hide these motives under those particular rocks. It is hard to believe
that, given the law's requirement that the basis for departure be articulated, 224
such a judge would risk having the improper motive revealed. Even the
slightest reduction in such motivation is a victory forjustice, and the simple act
of exposing those motives to the light will have that effect. 25
Finally, in answer to those critics who would see these changes as the
undoing of the Guidelines, the departures, to achieve the traditional goals, need
not be unlimited. Because it is only the threat of excessively large departures

controlled by prosecutors with judicial oversight results in sentencing disparities).
220. Albonetti, supra note 219, at 806.
221. Freed, supra note 10, at 1683.

222. To compound the mayhem, the circuit courts of appeal vary widely in the amount of
discretion they allow for such departures. See Goldsmith & Porter, supra note 13, at 73-76.
223. Berman, supra note 11, at 104.
As noted before, though the existing jurisprudence has developed and
formal decisions have been rendered without significant consideration of

sentencing purposes, underlying concerns andjudgments about culpability,
crime control, and the traditional purposes of punishment seem to be

influencing departure rulings and outcomes. But such normative
considerations remain unarticulated and undeveloped because they are
currently buried under the cover of descriptive deliberation or entirely

hidden through the process of guidelines circumvention.
Id. (footnote omitted).
224. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2000).
225. Although there will still be ways to hide improper motives, there just will be fewer
of them, and they will be more obvious.
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that truly pose a threat of creating serious disparities,226 a brake on such
departures could be created limiting them to an effective range of half of the
bottom of the original guideline and twice the top--that is, by effectively
multiplying the 25% range of discretion already granted without need for a
departure under the Sentencing Guidelines. 27 For example, a crime for which
the effective range is 120-150 months could be expanded to 60-300 months
should a departure based on retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, or
incapacitation be substantiated. Of course, another brake on such departures
will be statutory mandatory minimums (with all the problems and benefits they
entail).228 Providing more assurance that we will not return to those supposedly
"bad old days" are the facts that, unlike the period before the Guidelines,
appellate review is now available for all aspects of sentencing, 229 and parole,
perhaps the largest factor making the old system indeterminate, is now
extinct. 230
While it is short of the overthrow of the Guidelines Some seek,2 31 this
single reform, even with limits in place, could make federal sentencing more
rational and honest, and perhaps most importantly, could return to judges the
ability to do what their careers have prepared them for-to make decisions with
foresight to the future of the defendant and society, rather than the attention to
process and code-reading demanded of them today.
2.

The Abandonment ofRelevant Conduct

The current rule for treating relevant conduct 23 2 has come under fire from
many for allowing the drastic alteration of a sentence from that charged, based
on the thinnest hearsay evidence included in a pre-sentence report, which is
neither considered by a jury nor held to a standard higher than preponderance
of the evidence 3 As discussed here, it has also corroded the sentencing process
by providing an incentive to the prosecutor to shift fact-gathering to sentencing

226. Berman, supra note 11, at 97.
227. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES

MANUAL

§ 5A (2001).

228. The benefits of mandatory minimums (including the ability of Congress to mandate
sentences in areas seen as most important) have received little comment relative to the deluge

of complaints about their effects. E.g., Lowenthal, supra note 29, at 121 ("Although these
provisions undoubtedly increase both the percentage of persons sentenced to prison and the
duration of their confinement, there is no guarantee that they in fact separate out the worst
offenders.").

229. 18 U.S.C.§ 3742(a) (1994).
230. See supra Part II.A.5.
231. E.g., Shari L. Kaufman, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Formulaic and
ImpersonalApproach to Dispensing Justice, NEV. LAWYER, Sept. 1999, at 18 (noting serious
flaws in the Sentencing Guidelines).
232. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1BI.3 (2001).

233. See supra Part II.B.5.
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rather than trial, which has the larger effect of making sentencing processoriented rather than outcome-oriented.3
Prior to the Guidelines, judges were not limited in the information they
could consider in coming to a sentence anywhere beneath the statutory cap.235
The relevant conduct rules of the Guidelines were an attempt to incorporate this
existing power into the scheme.2 36 The suggestions for compromise between
this interest and the critics have often been complex. For example, Judge
Edward Becker of the Third Circuit has suggested that when such evidence will
be used, a bench conference should be held where the proposed evidence is
2 37
compared to an "unfairness index.
Instead, we should get rid of relevant conduct as described in section 1B 1.3
and allow a modified charge offense system. The sentence would be based on
the charged offense only, but a departure (limited as described above) would
be available based on the need for incapacitation if the need for such
incapacitation was based on other acts shown to the sentencing judge beyond
a reasonable doubt by the government. 238 Thus, the compromise between the
free consideration of evidence by the court and a focus on the charge would
endure, with an increased level of protection provided to defendants, and the
incentive to the government to defer fact-finding to sentencing would be
removed. Just as importantly, it would return to the fore the individual outcome
goal of incapacitation, which is now largely buried under the increasingly
complex process of sentencing.
3. Allowing for a Defense Motion for a Downward Departurefor
Cooperationwith the Government
Understandably, defendants and courts alike have been frustrated by the
exclusive control the Guidelines give prosecutors over motions for a downward
departure for cooperation with the government.239 Currently, such a downward
departure can only be made "[u]pon motion of the government stating that the
defendant has provided substantial assistance" to the government.2 40 Again, this
is a problem that can be resolved by incorporating the traditional goals of
sentencing into the active life of the Guidelines.

234. Id.
235. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
236. See Freed, supra note 10, at 1712-15.
237. Edward R. Becker, Insuring Reliable Fact Findingin Guidelines Sentencing: Must
the Guaranteesofthe ConfrontationandDueProcessClauses be Applied?, 151 F.R.D. 153, 156

(1993).
238. The increased burden on the government would likely solve the problem of hearsay

at sentencing-the higher burden would insure the use of stronger evidence, ifjudges are to be
fair.
239. See Karen Bjorkman, Note, Who's The Judge? The Eighth Circuit's Struggle with
SentencingGuidelines andthe Section 5K].1 Departure, 18 WM. MITCHELLL. REv. 731,732-33

(1992).
240. U.S.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
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Without deleting the current text of section 5K1.1, a new paragraph could
allow a cooperating defendant to move for a downward departure based on a
decreased need for retribution (given his cooperation with the government),
regardless of whether the government believed such assistance was
"substantial."
As with the other suggestions, this would give the traditional goals an
active role within the portions of the Guidelines that most often are the focus
of sentencing. At long last, section 1A of the Guidelines-acknowledging that
these same Guidelines are to "further the basic purposes of criminal
deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and
punishment:
rehabilitation," 24 -will finally mean something.
V.

CONCLUSION

From the firstjudgments, the goals of sentencing have been purposeful-to
change the conduct of the individual offender and to protect society. However,
in the realm of federal criminal law, we have buried this primal need under
layers of process and a devotion to the evasive goal of uniformity.
To return these traditional goals of sentencing-retribution, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and incapacitation-to the fore, they must be worked into the
Guidelines at the points where those Guidelines are most vigorously and
publicly debated, massaged, and manipulated. By incorporating them as the
basis of departures, especially in the realm of relevant conduct and 5K1.1
departures, they will be thrust into those most hotly disputed battlegrounds.
Perhaps most importantly, this will again give judges permission to look up
from the Guidelines Manual and the complex process that sentencing has
become, and actually see the defendant-perhaps as a threat, perhaps with
hope, perhaps even with that ancient flourish, "For you are dust, [a]nd to dust
'
you shall return."242

241. Id. § IAI.
242. Genesis 3:19 (New American Standard).
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